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ABSTRACT
We assume that the processes of analogy
formulation  and  modification  comprise  some
combination  of  finding  and  representing  a
fruitful source domain, forming appropriate as-
sociations, making predictions and inferences,
verifying  these  new  ideas,  and  learning  (not
necessarily in this order). We argue that these
processes are as ubiquitous and fundamental in
mathematics as they are elsewhere in empirical
science,  and  therefore  ideas  in  analogy  re-
search apply equally to mathematics. As a case
study, we explore the origin and evolution of
the  Descartes–Euler  conjecture,  and  discuss
how  geometry  has  developed  via  analogies
which  were  used  to  invent  and  analyse  this
conjecture.
1 INTRODUCTION 
Analogies in geometry between two and three
dimensions  have  been  bearing  both  healthy
and unhealthy fruit for millennia. Dating back
to Babylonian times, analogical mappings have
been made between area and volume, line and
plane,  length  and  area,  shape  and  solid,  tri-
angle and pyramid, trapezoid and frustum, par-
allelogram  (formed  by  two  pairs  of  parallel
lines)  and  parallelepiped  (formed  by  three
pairs of parallel planes),  and so on. The ana-
logy  has  been  used  to  suggest  new  entities,
concepts, conjectures and representations, and
to help to evaluate or support conjectures and
thus  motivate  a proof attempt.   Of particular
interest to us, is the role of this and other ana-
logies  in  the  origin  and  evolution  of
Descartes--Euler's conjecture.  In this example
the  target  domain  is  geometrical  solids  and
their  classification,  and  different  source  do-
mains are  invoked at  different  points to sug-
gest,  evaluate,  develop  and  prove  the
Descartes--Euler conjecture. These source do-
mains themselves are open to improvement via
analogy forming processes. 
This well developed and well documented ana-
logy is  a useful  example in  analogy research
since case studies often come from elsewhere
in  empirical  science.  Taking  a  descriptive
rather than normative approach, and analysing
historical analogies and mappings in different
contexts and domains is important for testing
the  generality  of  ideas  in  analogy  research.
We assume that processes of analogy formula-
tion and modification include finding and rep-
resenting  a  fruitful  source  domain,  mapping
appropriate  associations,  making  predictions
and inferences, verifying these new ideas, and
learning  from  the  analogy.  We  discuss  how
these processes apply to our case study, and ar-
gue that they are as interlinked, messy and es-
sential  in  mathematical  thought  as  they  are
elsewhere in science. 
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2 ANALOGIES BETWEEN DIF-
FERENT DIMENSIONS IN
GEOMETRY
One of the earliest  examples  of an ana-
logy between two and three dimensional geo-
metry was the Babylonian negative analogy (in
Hesse's  terms  [9])  between  the  area  of  a
trapezoid (formed by cutting off the top of a
triangle by a line parallel to the base of the tri-
angle) and the volume of a frustum (formed by
cutting off the top of a pyramid by a plane par-
allel to the base of the pyramid), shown in Fig-
ure 1. 
Figure 1. Analogy between a 2-dimensional
trapezoid and 3-dimensional frustum in figures (i)
and (ii) respectively. The A and B denote the
length of the base and top lines in figure (i), and
the area of the base and top polygons in figure (ii).
The formula for the area of a trapezoid is
h*½(A + B), where A and B are the length of
lines A and B, and trapezoids can be seen as
analogous  to  frusta;  with  area  mapping  to
volume, and length of the base and top lines of
a trapezoid mapping to the area of the base and
top of a frustum. Hence, the Babylonians made
the incorrect analogical inference that  the for-
mula  for  the  volume  of  a  frustum would  be
h*½(A + B), where A and B are the areas of
the polygons A and B [6, pp 4–6]. While use
of analogy is easier to spot when the analogy
fails,   Babylonians also knew the formula for
calculating  the  volume  of  a  parallelepided
(area*height), and since this can be found us-
ing the same mappings and one between a par-
allelogram (with an area of base*height) and a
parallelepided, it is likely that the analogy was
also used in this (and other) fruitful ways1.
While demonstrating the lack of verifica-
tion after inference (a reflection on the stand-
ards of rigour in mathematics at the time), this
example also shows that mappings which sug-
gest correct inferences between some elements
of  a  domain  may  be  lead  to  incorrect  infer-
ences for other elements. Such flawed but use-
ful  analogies  should  not  be  rejected  prema-
turely, but used with caution.
One  of  Descartes’s  contributions  to
mathematics, and as the forerunner of Euler in
this  field,  was  to  further  develop  analogies
between two and three dimensional geometry.
For instance, he suggested a three-dimensional
analogue of Pythagoras’s theorem, that for any
right-angled triangle with sides a, b and c, a2 +
b2 = c2 where c is the side subtending the right
angle. Descartes’s formulation in three dimen-
sions was A2 + B2 + C2= D2, where A, B, C are
the areas of the three sides and D is the area of
the base which is opposite to the right-angled
corner.   Even more interesting is  his  four-di-
mensional  analogue:  α2  +  β2  +γ2  +  δ2   =  ε2,
where α, β, γ and δ are the volumes of the four
solids  and  ε is  the  volume  of  the  solid  “op-
posed to the right angle”. (Attempts to extend
Pythagoras’s theorem to multi-dimensions are
also  found  in  [7].)   This  latter  conjecture  is
curious, since Descartes did not suggest a map-
ping between right angle in two dimensions to
right angle in four dimensions. Thus, the con-
jecture  is  meaningless  in  the  conventional
sense, although clearly meaningful as a conjec-
ture  full  of  intuition  and  potential.   Ludwig
Schläfli subsequently defined the mapping and
extended  the  Pythagorean  theorem  to  the
multi-dimensional  case:  see  [19,  p.  193],
quoted in [18, p.130]. This suggests that infer-
1A parallelogram is formed by two pairs of parallel
lines, and includes squares, rectangles, rhombi, etc. and a
parallelepiped  by three  pairs  of  parallel  planes,  and  in-
cludes cubes (six square faces),  cuboids (six rectangular
faces) and rhombohedra (six rhombus faces), etc.
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ence  steps  are  sometimes  made  before map-
pings have been made.
3 INITIAL MAPPINGS FOR
DESCARTES – EULER’S
CONJECTURE
      A formulation of Descartes–Euler’s con-
jecture states that for any polyhedra, the num-
ber of vertices (V) minus the number of edges
(E) plus the number of faces (F) is equal to 2.
This relationship holds for regular polyhedra;
we show this for the cube, the tetrahedron and
the octahedron in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Euler’s conjecture: V - E + F = 2
for the cube, the tetrahedron and the octahedron.
While Descartes came very close to for-
mulating the conjecture [4,  Part I] Euler  was
the first to do so explicitly [5, Proposition 4]:
“in every solid body bounded by plane faces
the sum of the number of solid angles and the
number of faces exceeds the number of edges
by two”.  While it is not known precisely how
he  arrived  at  the  conjecture,  the  analogy
between the polyhedral and polygonal domains
and  the  relationship  between  the  number  of
sides and angles of a polygon certainly played
a role,  at least in Euler’s own rational recon-
struction  of  the  conjecture2.   In  the  notation
2
 In a letter of November, 1750 to Christian Goldbach, he
wrote: “Recently it occurred to me to determine the gener-
al properties of solids bounded by plane faces, because
there   is no doubt that general theorems can be found for
them, just as for plane rectilinear figures, whose proper-
ties are: (1) that in every plane figure the number of sides
is equal to the number of angles, and (2) that the sum of all
the angles is equal to twice as many angles as there are
sides, less four.”. In his editorial summary of [5] (pub-
lished later the same month): “While in plane geometry
polygons could be classified very easily according to the
number of their sides, which of course is always equal to
the number of their angles, in stereometry the classifica-
tion of polyhedra represents a much more difficult prob-
lem, since the number of faces alone is insufficient for this
used  for  some  analogies,  the  question  is
formed as:
polyhedrapolygonsEV :?:::=
The  mapping  between  the  angles and
sides components  of  polygons  onto  today’s
vertices,  edges and faces components of poly-
hedra was  not  trivial.  It  can quickly be seen
that there is no straightforward mapping such
that V = E would hold. Even generalising to “V
increases with E” fails in some cases, although
holds  for  most  under  a  standard  mapping  (a
pair of examples where this conjecture fails is
a pentagonal prism, which has 10 vertices and
15 edges, and a tower consisting of a pyramid
whose  base is  placed on the  upper  face  of a
cube,  which  has  9  vertices  but  16  edges).
Hence, careful thought is required to pull out
relevant  features  and  produce  an  appropriate
mapping.
In the polygonal conjecture, the compon-
ent  “face”  is  an  irrelevant  feature  (noise),
whereas in polyhedra it is a key feature. One
possible  mapping  of  a  “face”  of  a  polygon
would be to a “face” of a polyhedron. Such a
mapping, in which salience is high in the target
and low in the base, would contrast Ortony’s
salience  imbalance  theory  [15].   This  states
that common features with high salience in the
source domain and low salience in the target
domain  are mapped to  each other.   The fact
that  our  polygons/polyhedra  analogy  makes
sense in both directions, i.e. information from
the ‘target’ can be used to further knowledge
about the ‘source’ as well as vice versa, may
be relevant  here:  Ortony’s  examples  are  uni-
directional metaphors (for example, “dew is a
veil” and “billboards are warts”). Another po-
tential  mapping  would  be  from  polygonal
“sides” to polyhedral “faces”, since in their re-
spective  domains  they  each bound  the  entity
under investigation. 
For  sides  of  a  face,  Euler  distinguished
between the polygonal concept “side”, and the
analogy-generated  polyhedral  concept
purpose” (quoted in footnote one [12, p6]) (our italics).
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“edge” (Euler used the Latin terms ‘latus’ for
side and ‘acies’ for edge) – “the joints where
two faces  come together  side to  side,  which,
for  lack  of  an  accepted  word  I  call
`edges’” (letter to Christian Goldbach, Novem-
ber, 1750).  “Angles” is ambiguous in three di-
mensions:  they  could  map  to  solid  angles,
plane angles (of all  the faces of the polyhed-
ron),  or dihedral angles (the internal  angle at
which two adjacent faces meet).  To select an
appropriate mapping, Euler fluctuated between
two analogous relationships both in the domain
of  polygons:  V=E and Σα= (V–2)pi (where  α
runs through all the interior angles of a convex
polygon).  In the latter  relationship, translated
to the polyhedra domain, counterexamples can
be found in all three mappings of the interior
angle  (dihedral  or  solid  or  plane  angles).  In
this case the counterexamples themselves, and
their  mappings  back  to  the  source  domain,
need to be examined. For instance, if angle is
mapped to dihedral angle,  then Σα varies for
tetrahedra  according  to  their  shape  (whether
there  is  a  right  angle  between  two  planes),
whereas  in  their  polygonal  counterparts,  tri-
angles, Σα does not vary according to whether
it is a right-angled triangle or otherwise (it is
always 180° in Euclidean geometry). Thus, the
mapping from angle to dihedral angle is rejec-
ted. For further  details  on hypothesised map-
pings  between the two domains,  see [20,  pp.
150–154]. Following such negotiations,  Euler
mapped “faces” to “faces”, “sides” to “edges”
and “angles” to “solid angles” (which later be-
come vertices) to get his famous conjecture.
4 POLYA’S MATHEMATICS AND
ANALOGICAL REASONING
Euler implied that analogy with polygons
inspired his search for an equation that related
key features in polyhedra. Polya, in contrast, in
his study on heuristic methods in mathematics,
suggests that the analogy was only induced to
test the  Descartes—Euler  conjecture  to  see
whether  it  was  worthy  of  a  proof  attempt.
Polya  introduces  analogy  at  a  point  where
Euler’s conjecture has been suggested by sci-
entific  induction,  has  passed  several  increas-
ingly  difficult  tests  but  failed  on  the  picture
frame example. As a consequence, the conjec-
ture  has  been  modified  to  “all  convex  poly-
hedra” and a new test is required with a new
kind of support, rather than further supporting
examples, in order to restore confidence in the
conjecture.   This  motivation  lies  some  way
between  Euler’s  motivation of  using  an ana-
logy to generate a new problem, and the tradi-
tional view that analogy can help to  solve an
existing problem. 
     Having made the mappings between the
two domains (see Section 3), and achieved the
analogous relations: “for all polygons,  V =  E”
and “for all convex polyhedra, V –  E + F = 2”,
Polya suggests that we now adjust the repres-
entation in order to bring these relations closer.
Noting  that  the  polyhedron  is  3-dimensional,
its faces 2-dimensional, its edges 1-dimension-
al and its vertices 0-dimensional,  we may re-
write these equations in order of the increasing
dimensions. Thus, V = E is written in the form
V –  E + 1 = 1. (We could go one step further
and rewrite the 1 as the number of faces,  as-
suming that  all  polygons have one face.)  We
can similarly rewrite our polyhedral relation as
V – E + F – 1 = 1.  In both of these, the num-
ber  of  dimensions  starts  at  zero  on  the  left
hand side of the equation, increases by one and
has alternating signs. The right hand side is the
same in both cases. 
     Polya then suggests that since the two rela-
tions are very close and the first  relation, for
polygons is true, then we have reason to think
that  the  second  relation  may  be  true,  and  is
therefore worthy of a serious proof effort. This
technique  is  encapsulated  in  Polya’s  advice
when faced with a difficult problem to solve:
“Is  there  a  simpler  problem?”  as  well  as the
surprising  “Is  there  a  more  general
problem?” [17].
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5 LAKATOS’S PROOFS AND
ASSOCIATIONS
Lakatos’s  characterisation  of  informal
mathematics  [12]  fairly  abounds  with  meta-
phors and analogies, which leap out from the
page  to  excite  the  mind  of  the  analogy  re-
searcher.  These are  delightfully  sarcastic  (“A
woman  with  a  child  in  her  womb  is  not  a
counterexample  to  the  thesis  that  human  be-
ings have one head” p.15), insightful (“Colum-
bus  did  not  reach  India  but  he  discovered
something  quite  interesting”  p.  14)  and  pro-
vocative  (“if  you  want  to  know  the  normal
healthy  body,  study  it  when  it  is  abnormal,
when it is ill” p. 23). He describes a world in
which ‘hopeful monsters’ clash with ‘ordinary
decent polyhedra’, polygons have limbs which
should be free to stretch out into space, poly-
hedra have a lunatic fringe, and hang in terato-
logical museums, mathematicians build strong-
holds  into  which  they  strategically  retreat,
wicked anarchists battle against dogmatic con-
servatives,  mathematical  method is  an evolu-
tionary  struggle  between  monstrous  mutants
and harmonious order, discovery is a zip that
goes up or down or may follow a zig-zag path,
heuristics  can be sterile,  and rival  interpreta-
tions of objects are seen as ‘distorted imprints
on a sick mind, twisting in pain’. 
Lakatos’s story is presented as a ration-
ally  reconstructed  dialogue  between  students
and their teacher.  It begins at the point when
having  used  the  two-dimensional  analogy  to
suggest  the  Descartes–Euler  conjecture  for
classifying regular and other simple polyhedra,
a  new  source  domain  is  introduced,  by
Cauchy, for attempting a proof. The extension,
but  not  intension,  of  polyhedra  is  roughly
known  and  agreed.  The  intension  is  debated
later on, after interactions with properties that
hold for different explicit definitions of poly-
hedron.   Cauchy’s  proof embeds  the original
conjecture (about crystals, or solids) in the the-
ory of  rubber  sheets.  This  is  Lakatos’s  most
explicit  use of analogy: “I propose to use the
time-honoured  technical  term  ‘proof’  for  a
thought-experiment – or ‘quasi-experiment’ –
which suggests a decomposition of the original
conjecture into subconjectures or lemmas, thus
embedding it in a possibly quite distant  body
of knowledge” [12, p. 9]. He describes exactly
the sorts of interlinked processes of discovery,
justification and representation as proposed by
Chalmers  et  al.  in  the  context  of  high-level
perception, representation and analogy [3]. 
In writing the story as dialogue, Lakatos
allows  different  goals  and  beliefs  about  the
value  of  the  conjecture,  the  validity  of  the
proof,  mathematical  methodology,  etc.  to  af-
fect which analogies and mappings are chosen.
This is very much in line with cognitive sci-
entific and psychological thought that percep-
tion may be influenced by belief (see, for ex-
ample [1]), by goals (see [11]), and can be rad-
ically reshaped where necessary (see [14], also
[3, pp. 171–172]). Examples of a shift in high-
level  perception,  when  we  re-perceive
something  in  a  different  way,  include
Lakatos’s  methods  of  monster-barring  and
monster-adjusting.  The former consists  of re-
perceiving the boundaries of a source or target
domain so that  particular objects fall  outside,
rather than inside the boundaries.  Monster-ad-
justing consists of a Gestalt shift in perception,
where features of an object are suddenly per-
ceived in a very different way.  Lakatos gives
the  example  of  the  star  polyhedron,  initially
perceived as having 12 vertices, 30 edges and
12 faces, as a counterexample.  Others object
to this perception, saying that this is the case
only if each face is a pentagon. This interpreta-
tion can be adjusted to seeing each face as a
triangle,  in which case the equation becomes
32 – 90 + 60 = 2 and therefore it is no longer a
counterexample.  Likewise,  polyhedra  are  re-
perceived each time the conjecture is embed-
ded in a different body of knowledge (includ-
ing vector algebra, projective geometry, algeb-
raic  topology,  etc.).  As  highlighted  by
Chalmers [3], and Holyoak and Thagard [10],
amongst others, context and goals play an im-
portant role in determining which domains we
associate and which mappings we form, when
making, interpreting or evaluating an analogy.
Thus, by showing different tasks that mathem-
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aticians  perform,  i.e.,  forming,  representing
and modifying axioms,  entities,  concepts and
conjectures  and  proofs,  as  well  as  differing
motivations  within  these  tasks,  Lakatos
presents a fertile domain for discussing inter-
actions  between  different  processes  in  analo-
gical reasoning. (Many of these tasks have typ-
ically been given short shrift  by philosophers
of  mathematics,  mathematical  educators  and
other  researchers  in  how  mathematics  is  or
should be done. One other notable exception is
work by cognitive scientists Lakoff and Núñez
[13], who place metaphor at the heart of math-
ematics  and  suggest  how a  large  number  of
concepts in arithmetic and other domains have
been developed via metaphor.)  
After  much  jostling  and  negotiating
over the conjecture and concept definitions and
its analogy to rubber sheets and after effort has
been expended on showing that the conjecture
“V – E + F = 2” is (or is not) a good mapping
(whether  it  was  a  positive  or  negative
analogy), the students come back to the prob-
lem and a new analogy is suggested. This in-
volves reshaping the perception of a polyhed-
ron from a rubber sheet to a matrix of edges,










for n-spheroid polyhedra with ek edges. [12, p.
79]. During the course of the conjecture’s de-
velopment, polyhedra (solids) are seen as ana-
logous  to  polygons  (to  formulate  the  initial
problem and conjecture), rubber sheets (to un-
derstand the conjecture and the concepts in it,
and to find an initial proof), vector algebra (to
find a formal proof), projective geometry [8],
analytical topology [2], and algebraic topology
[16].
The fact that the initial analogy between
polygons  and polyhedra makes sense  in both
directions  becomes  apparent  when  questions
raised in the ‘target’ domain of polyhedra are
then translated back to the polygonal ‘source’
domain and used to develop polygonal notions
and to expand this domain [12, pp 70–73].
6 CONCLUSION 
It is important that components of analo-
gical reasoning which have been identified in
specific  domains  are  considered in  other  do-
mains.  This  will  both  test  the  generality  of
such  components  and  exploit  ideas  from re-
search  in  analogy  to  inform  ways  in  which
people reason in domains which have received
less attention.  The case study of analogies in
the  Descartes–Euler  conjecture  explores  the
complex  interaction  between  different  pro-
cesses  of  analogy  formulation  and  modifica-
tion, as well as emphasising the role that ana-
logy has played in the origin and development
of  concepts,  conjecture,  proof  and  associated
fields.   
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